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S D Pradhan has served as chairman of India's Joint Intelligence Committee. He has also been the country's deputy national security adviser. He was chairman of the Task Force on Intelligence Mechanism (2008-2010), which was constituted to review the functioning of the intelligence agencies. He has taught at the departments of defence studies and history at the Punjabi University, Patiala. He was also a visiting professor at the University of Illinois, US, in the department of arms control and disarmament studies. The ministry of defence had utilized his services for the preparation of official accounts of the 1971 war and the counterinsurgency operations in the northeast. In the JIC/National Security Council secretariat, he was closely involved with the preparation of the reports of the Kargil Review Committee and the Group of Ministers on national security as also with the implementation of their recommendations. His publications include two books and several articles. LESS ... MORE
The Battle of Asal Uttar that was fought from 8 to 10 September 1965, fifty-seven years ago, is regarded as the largest tank battle since the Battle of Kursk of the Second World War. Military historians have described this battle as the turning point in the war leading to the Pakistan Army’s total rout and complete failure to achieve its sinister objective to grab Jammu and Kashmir and Amritsar city. This battle reflected not only the courage of the Indian soldiers but also the dexterous strategic planning and the execution. The battle was fought when Pakistani forces, with the help of American Patton tanks, had captured Khem Karan, a small Indian town 5km inside the international border. Pakistani forces were eyeing a siege at the holy city of Amritsar, and the Indian army knew that if Amritsar fell, Indian defeat would be certain.
Pakistan under Gen Ayub Khan had been hatching a conspiracy to grab J&K since long, in which China played a crucial role. Pakistan made well calculated moves to exploit the international developments. During 1950s, Pakistan had joined SEATO and CENTO mainly to get arms from the US. It supported the US during the Cold War for this purpose. From 1954 to 1963, the Pak Army, Navy and Air Force received a number of contemporary weapons from the US, which were considered front line equipment of NATO. Simultaneously, Pakistan after the 1962 War, began to develop closer relations with China to deal with India. In 1963, the boundary agreement was made with China, under which it gave a part of J&K under its illegal occupation. Chou En-li visited Pak in July 1964 and discussed US-China relations. In March 1965, Ayub visited China and obtained the Chinese support for grabbing J&K.
On the other hand, India decides to remain neutral and support Non-Aligned Movement. India played an important role in the Bandung Conference and supported the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). The US was suspicious of India’s role in the NAM and didn’t want that it influenced other countries in the region. While soon after the 1962 war, the US came closer to India, Lyndon Johnson reversed the policy of Kennedy. China’s hostility towards India increased after 1962. The Soviet Union however began to see that India was not under the influence of US and the relations began to improve.
The Pak Army received 650 Patton, M 36B2 Tank Busters, Chaffee and Walker Bulldog tanks, 200 M113 Armoured Protected Carriers (APCs), 105mm and 155mm artillery guns, anti-tank recoilless rifles (RCLs) and Cobra anti-tank missiles and a large quantity of small arms and machine guns of various types. The Pak Airforce was equipped with two B-57 bomber squadrons, one F-104 supersonic squadron, nine F-86 Sabre jet squadrons, one C-130 transport squadron, six other squadrons of various aircraft, 30 helicopters, Falcon Sidewinder missiles and many types of bombs and rockets. The Pak Navy was modernised with one cruiser, five destroyers, eight minesweepers, one water tanker, one submarine and three tugs. The Pakistani armed forces were also trained to use these weapons. Pakistan raised eight pure Patton regiments and three mixed regiments in which there was one squadron out of three of M 36B2 Tank destroyers. The M 36B2 had the same gun as the Patton tank and even Sherman MKII tanks were equipped with Patton tank guns.
While India after the 1962 War debacle did increase its defence budget from Rs 300 crore to Rs 800 crore, most of the budget was spent on raising Mountain divisions to strengthen the defences there. India’s main battle tanks, the Centurion Mk VII, of the Second World War vintage were no match to Patton tanks in fire-power, range and mobility.
Gen Ayub had the perception that the Indian forces would not be able to withstand the Pak onslaught and held the view that one Pak soldier was equivalent to three Indian soldiers. He wrote to Gen Musa prior to the war, “As a general rule, Hindu morale would not stand for more than a couple of hard blows delivered at a right time and the right place. Such opportunities should be sought and exploited.”
Pakistan, finding the situation favourable, launched “Op Desert Hawk” in Kutch in April 1965 by arrogantly claiming that India was in occupation of Pakistani territory. This conflict encouraged Pak. China supported Pak and UK sponsored an agreement between India and Pak. Pak became confident that international pressure would prevail on India.
The above was actually the first phase of Pakistani strategy while the second phase had already started in tandem. Pakistan believed that there was considerable unrest against India amongst the population in Kashmir and all that was required was a spark to set-off a conflagration and Kashmir would fall to Pakistan. The “Op Gibraltar” was implemented, encouraged by China. About 30,000 infiltrators entered on 5th August, 1965, followed by Pak Army. Soon followed the “Op Grand Slam” to cross the international border by the Pak Army.
After the fall of Khem Karan, Indian forces consolidated defences in Asal Uttar. GOC Indian 4th Mountain Division, Maj. Gen. Gurbaksh Singh ordered the division to fall back and assume a horseshoe shaped defensive position with Asal Uttar as its focal point. The sugarcane fields allowed the Indian soldiers to hide. The unharvested sugarcane crop was a serendipity. Pakistani tanks took the bait and moved with their tanks but their pace was slowed down because of the swampy ground. The Pakistani forces had fallen for the horseshoe trap. Many of their tanks couldn’t move, and in the meanwhile, good old Indian tanks took care of the enemy and destroyed their ranks. Pakistan lost over a hundred tanks in the Battle of Asal Uttar alone. India lost 10.
No account of the Battle of Asal Uttar is complete without the mention of the bravery of Havaldar Abdul Hamid, who was later awarded the Param Vir Chakra. He took on the advancing Patton tanks with his ordinary anti-tank jeep. On September 9, Hamid had destroyed three Patton tanks with the help of his jeep, and had essentially become an eyesore for Pakistani soldiers. While he was attacking the fourth Pak tank, he was killed.
The Battle at Asal Uttar led to the creation of Patton Nagar, which is also known as the graveyard of Patton tanks. The crushing defeat of Pakistan in this battle was decisive. Simultaneously, Phillora was captured on 11th September, in which Pak 51 Patton and M 36B2 tanks had been destroyed. These completely shattered the myth of superiority of the Patton tanks. These battles reflected the Indian soldiers’ courage and professionalism. The Indian troops had also crossed the Ichhogil canal but later had to withdraw for lack of reinforcements. By 22 September, the east bank of the canal was secured.
The Battle of Asal Uttar was really the turning point of the war. Going by the aims, India achieved them while Pak miserably failed to capture J&K. Indian objectives were (i) to defeat Pak attempt to create ‘a rebellion in Kashmir’ (ii) to defeat Pak offensive and (iii) to occupy minimum of territory necessary to achieve the purpose. In a show of solidarity with Pakistan, China accused India of border violations and abducting 59 Yaks on 17th September that received ridicule of the international community.
The Tashkent Agreement followed, under which India gave up Haji Pir and Tithwal. Perhaps the Indian leadership out of its sense of restraint, fair play and endeavour to seek enduring peace and goodwill with the neighbour agreed but India lost an opportunity to settle the issue.
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Views expressed above are the author's own.
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